The respective retail banking sectors in the United Kingdom and the United States are distinguished by di®ering levels of competition and of deposit insurance. Deposit insurance in the United Kingdom amounts to $16,000 per depositor while the corresponding¯gure in the United States is $100,000. The retail banking sector in the United States is characterised by a high number of banks and high competition levels: in the United Kingdom there are fewer banks and lower competition levels, as witnessed by returns on equity for the retail banking sector as high as 30%. The apparent di®erence in competition levels is the source of a policy debate in the United Kingdom and led to the establishment of a broad review of banking sector services, under the chairmanship of Don Cruickshank.
The Cruickshank Committee Report (Cruickshank, 2000) suggests that the regulator should have a primary competition objective, in addition to its existing regulatory activities. This paper is of relevance in the light of this policy debate. It o®ers an explanation in terms of di®erences in regulator screening abilities for inter-jurisdictional di®erences in competition levels and deposit insurance provision. In our model, capital-constrained banks function as delegated monitors. Banks can achieve superior returns on investments but the proportion of their returns which is veri¯able is stochastic. Bankers abstract non-veri¯able returns and use them to consume perquisits. Although this does not a®ect the net social bene¯ts of bank managed investment a su±ciently high level of perquisit consumption may render bank contracts unattractive to depositors who will instead perform nonintermediated investment: this constitutes a social cost.
Some regulation is therefore necessary to protect the interests of depositors and hence to ensure the survival of the banking system { this could take the form of deposit insurance or an increase in bank rent levels, for example via the suppression of competition. The former o®ers a de¯nite guarantee of safety to depositors while the latter reduces moral hazard problems in the banking sector by raising the value to the banker of his license and hence increasing his incentive to prevent perquisit consumption. We examine the optimal mix of these policies: the paper makes two contributions.
Firstly, we demonstrate that the optimal policy will involve a trade-o® between the social costs of the two mechanisms which are available to the regulator.
It follows that an increase in U.K. banking sector competition towards the levels of the U.S. should be accompanied by an increase in deposit insurance levels.
Secondly, we show how the optimal mix of regulator policies will depend upon the ability of the regulator to identify unsound banks. In our model bankers are rentiers who take no principal risk. They merely extract an income from the possession of a banking license and may also pro¯t from the abstraction of project returns. Regulators can induce a greater degree of prudence in bankers by threatening to withdraw their licenses. This threat will only be credible if the regulator is able adequately to distinguish between good and bad banker behaviour. Those regulators who enjoy a high reputation for bank supervision will suppress banking competition the furthest and will select a parsimonious level of deposit insurance: the social cost of such a policy for regulators with poor reputations will be excessive and they will opt to reduce the rent on banking licenses and to o®er high levels of deposit insurance. Assuming that deposit insurance levels are non-sticky, this suggests that the current regulatory mix in the U.K. is evidence of a highly competent regulator.
In our model, the aggregate price for deposit insurance which enters the regulator's objective function is fair. It is a consequence of informational asymmetries in the economy that fairly priced deposit insurance is not possible at the level of the individual bank. In consequence, moral hazard problems cannot be resolved by charging bankers fair prices for insurance of their deposits. This point is developed further in the conclusion.
The¯rst treatment of banks as delegated monitors was due to Diamond (1984) for whom monitoring was veri¯cation of project returns. Diamond also demonstrated that the debt contract is optimal when non-pecuniary penalties are ad-missible and agents are risk neutral. Our model of monitoring is based upon a role for banks in project selection and management rather than upon the resolution of informational asymmetries which surround project returns: the relationship approach has been previously discussed by Mayer (1988) , Sharpe (1990) and Hellwig (1991) . Petersen & Rajan (1994) provide evidence of relationship bene¯ts for small borrowers.
In our model the veri¯able portion of bank-intermediated project returns is stochastic. Bankers will retain the non-veri¯able portion of project returns: this corresponds to the cases where income is spent perquisites such as empire building, excessive bonus payments and so on. Although these activities certainly happen in the banking sector, depositors are typically unable to prove in court that they represent unnecessary expenses: in some emerging economies they have rendered the successful operation of a banking sector virtually impossible. Bankers can exert e®ort to increase the transparency of their operations by for example investing in superior risk management systems or better auditing procedures but in the absence of regulation they will not choose to do so. We show how the contracting problem which exists between bankers and depositors can be resolved by a regulator who screens banks to reduce the likelihood that they abstract funds.
Our model extends an existing literature on competition and bank regulation.
The value associated with a bank license, or charter value, has been previously observed (Marcus, 1990) and its erosion in response to increasing levels of competition in the United States has been demonstrated by Keeley (1990) . Vives (1996, 2000) have examined the e®ect of bank competition upon portfolio diversi¯cation and upon levels of assumed risk, without discussion of charter value or of regulator reputation. The importance of rentier income to a sound banking system has been discussed by Boot & Greenbaum (1993) in a model where low levels of competition encourage prudential monitoring and by Gorton (1995) and Bhattacharya, Boot & Thakor (1998) who suggest that charter value can curb excessive bank risk-taking. Besanko & Thakor (1993) and Petersen & Rajan (1995) note that heightened competition may diminish the bene¯ts derived from relationship banking. Boot & Thakor (2000) demonstrate that the e®ects of competition can depend upon its source: interbank competition increases the number of relationship loans but diminishes their value to borrowers while capital market competition has the reverse implication. Welfare e®ects in their model are ambiguous. Caminal and Matutes (1997a) consider a dual moral hazard problem. Firstly, borrowers faced with a high cost of funds may indulge in asset substitution.
Secondly, banks may employ credit rationing rather than perform monitoring.
Increasing charter value encourages monitoring but it also raises the cost of funds and hence exacerbates the¯rst problem. When bank moral hazard is greatest, CM demonstrate that competition should be suppressed: note that if this occurs when the regulator is weakest, these results contradict ours. Caminal & Matutes (1997b) demonstrate that when competition is suppressed, bank portfolios are more concentrated so that they have a greater exposure to macroeconomic shocks.
In our model loan risk is reduced through diversi¯cation and charter value acts as an ex ante incentive to good bank management so that the relevance of charter value is determined by the screening competence of the regulator. The importance of regulator reputation has not been discussed in earlier treatments of this topic. In particular, previous discussions of deposit insurance have concentrated upon the associated moral hazard problem without acknowledging the relationship between charter value, deposit insurance and regulator reputation.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 1 describes a model of banks as delegated monitors when the veri¯able portion of project returns is stochastic and the e®ort which banks make to reduce opacity is nonveri¯able. Section 2 introduces a regulator who is able to set rent levels and deposit insurance policies and section 3 derives his optimal policy. Section 4 contains some concluding remarks which contrast regulation via capital hurdles with imposition of a \¯t and proper" requirement for banks and also discusses the di±culties of establishing a fairly priced deposit insurance r ¶ egime in the presence of asymmetric information. The proofs are contained in the appendix.
A Model for Banking with Asymmetric Information
Consider a single period economy. Investors in the economy have an initial endowment of $1. They are risk neutral and derive utility C from the consumption of C at the end of the period.
Two investment vehicles are available to investors: a bond which will return $r > $1, and a bank deposit. A bank is an institution which accepts unsecured deposits from investors and then invests them on their behalf in projects. In our model banks have no capital reserves: our substantive results are una®ected if their reserves are fractional. It is a consequence of our capitalisation assumption that bankers do not assume principal risk.
The role of bankers in our model is as delegated monitors. We assume that the banker has information gathering, monitoring and contracting skills which are denied to individual investors. In the absence of monitoring, entrepreneurs will select high risk socially sub-optimal projects. We do not model this process explicitly but we assume that as a consequence of their superior monitoring skills, the return on bank-intermediated projects is R > r.
Bankers can earn a return upon their activity in two ways. Firstly, they can earn rent from the possession of a banking license: we refer to this rent as charter value. Rent is earned by the legal abstraction of some of the deposits which they receive. This could be achieved through collusive practices when there is little competition in the banking sector; alternatively it could be a consequence of regulatory strictures which disallow the payment of high returns on deposit contracts, as for example in France. We denote by m the total rent which a banker derives from running a bank.
The second source of income which bankers earn is from the abstraction of project returns. We assume that although the total return on bank intermediated projects is R this need not always be veri¯able. The veri¯able return which bankers earn is either R or (1 ¡ f) R; if it is the latter then we say that the bank is opaque. Bankers retain the non-veri¯able part Rf of total returns in opaque banks. We call the probability that a bank will be opaque its opacity. There are two types of bank: sound banks have opacity p and unsound banks have opacity q > p.
The delegated monitoring activities of banks were modelled by Diamond (1984) . In Diamond's paper the return on entrepreneur projects was not observable and banks achieved economies of scale by operating a costly auditing technology on behalf of their depositors. Banks were provided with an incentive truthfully to report the results of their audits by non-pecuniary penalties which were levied in proportion to shortfalls in declared earnings. In our model no enforceable contract can be written upon total project returns and non-pecuniary penalties are therefore legally unenforceable. Moreover, we cannot rely as Diamond does upon the Law of Large Numbers to reduce the deadweight costs of fund abstraction: banks of any size will be subject to this e®ect.
It is possible for a banker to manage his bank well and thus to reduce its opacity. This will involve such activities as operational and market risk management, improved auditing and investment in computerised reporting systems. The banker can cause his bank to be sound with probability ¾ at a cost to himself of e (¾): we call the probability ¾ the banker's e®ort level. Bankers are risk neutral: the banker derives utility v (m; ¾) from charter value m and e®ort level ¾, where
e (:) is increasing and convex.
The managerial e®ort of bankers is not directly enforceable and its consequence is simply to adjust the probability with which returns are non-veri¯able.
It cannot therefore form the basis of an enforceable contract between depositors and bankers. Moreover, banker e®ort is not a®ected by the ex post division of veri¯able returns since fund abstraction is always in their interests so that incentive contracts of the Grossman & Hart (1983) type will be ine®ective. The optimal contract will therefore give all of the veri¯able returns to the depositors.
In the absence of regulatory intervention bankers will have no incentive to exert e®ort and the bank will be unsound.
Assume that investment in unsound banks is less attractive to investors that investment in the bond market which is in turn less attractive than investment in sound banks:
Assumption A1 states that in the absence of any type of regulation there will not be a banking system. Investors will then invest via the bond market and total production will be below the maximum possible level.
De¯ne b 2 (0; 1) as follows:
b is the highest level of bank opacity which investors will tolerate.
Bank Regulation
Bank project management results in superior investment returns and the maintenance of a viable banking system will therefore be welfare-increasing. We therefore introduce a social welfare maximiser whom we call the regulator whose role is to ensure the existence of a banking sector. This is accomplished by protecting investor interests to ensure that bank deposits are more attractive to them than bond investments.
No bank can operate without a license issued by the regulator. The regulator can employ one of two strategies: he can o®er deposit insurance to protect investors against the losses which arise when bank returns are non-veri¯able and he can select the rent m which accrues to the holder of a banking license. We assume that m is bounded above:
Distribution of deposit insurance takes the form of an ex-post bailout. The regulator announces at the start of the banking contract that he will underwrite bank returns with probability¯: we refer to¯as the regulator's insurance policy.
The regulator's control of m could be e®ected in several ways: for example, ceteris paribus the rent m will be a decreasing function of the number of banks and rent levels can be determined through an explicit competition policy. Alternatively, m could be varied through the use of capital reserve requirements, through the imposition of deposit rate ceilings or via taxation policy.
[ Figure We assume that there are many potential bankers, each of whom has only one opportunity to apply for a license. One at a time, bankers select their e®ort level ¾ and incur a utility cost e (¾) in the reduction of opacity. The regulator audits the bank: if it is judged to be sound it is given a banking license. This process is repeated until N licences have been awarded.
In allocating licenses, the regulator will operate an imperfect auditing technology. The auditing technology comprises all of the mechanisms by which a bank's performance may be judged: it includes such items as the disclosure requirements to which the bankers are subject and the regulatory environment in which they operate. The regulator will use the technology to make a judgement about the soundness of the bank: s is the event that the regulator decides that the bank is sound (occupies state S ) and u is the event that the regulator decides that the bank is unsound (occupies state U ). Licenses will only be awarded to banks which are judged to be sound.
Two types of auditing technology exist: good and bad. Good technology generates the wrong signal with probability°< 1 2 and bad technology generates the wrong signal with probability No one, including the regulator, knows which technology is in use: an ex ante probability ® is assigned that the extant technology is good. We refer to ® as the reputation of the regulator. It is convenient to de¯ne the following quantity:
¤ is the unconditional probability that the regulator is wrong: we refer to this term as the fallibility of the auditing technology. In other words,
Banking licenses are awarded before investors make their portfolio allocation decisions. The expected utility which a banker derives from e®ort ¾ is therefore
The banker selects ¾ to maximise this, subject to the requirement that ¾ 2 [0; 1].
We will shortly parameterise e (:) to ensure that ¾ · 1 and it follows that the optimum e®ort level ¾ satis¯es equation 1 with ¾¸0 or that ¾ = 0:
To determine the optimal investment policy we assume that e (¾) has the following quadratic form:
Equation 1 then yields the following expression for ¾ (m; w):
Proposition 1 demonstrates that the comparative statics of ¾ (w; m) are a®ected by regulation in a sensible fashion. To derive it we impose some assumptions upon our parameters.
Firstly, we require the di®erence between sound and unsound banks to be bounded above:
Secondly, we require E to be bounded below:
Note that assumptions A4 and A5 together ensure that e (¾) and the denominator of equation 2 are both positive. Finally, we require°to be bounded below:°>
Proposition 1 The e®ort level ¾ (m; w) satis¯es:
1. ¾ (M;°) · 1; ¾ (m; 0:5) = 0; ¾ (0; w) = 0.
2.
@¾ @w
Bankers in our model compete in a tournament for banking licenses. Proposition 1 demonstrates that they will increase their e®ort when the probability of being recognised for doing so increases and when the reward for success increases.
Consider a bank which has been awarded a license. Conditional upon an e®ort level ¾ by bankers, the investors will assess respective probabilities p S and p U that it is sound (of type S) and unsound (of type U) as follows:
;
When the regulator has a fallibility level w the opacity of a randomly selected bank is given by
Proposition 2 Bank opacity is increasing in the fallibility of the auditing technology and is decreasing in the rent m which accrues to holders of banking licenses:
At each time t in the game the regulator attempts to maximise the utility which accrues to the participants in the time t economy. If the policy (m;¯)
generates a total output h (m;¯; w) 2 fr; Rg per investor when the regulator's fallibility is w then it will yield a social utility of h (m;¯; w) ¡ g (´m + Rf Á (m; w)) .
h (:) represents the total production in the economy: the regulator is assumed to be unconcerned about questions of distribution. RfÁ (m; w) is the cost per investor of bailouts and´is a constant which re°ects the relative importance of rents and bailouts in the social cost function. g (:) is an increasing convex function. Observe that the total social cost of insurance is fairly priced in the regulator's objective function: we discuss the implications of this in the conclusion. In section 3 we determine optimal regulatory policy.
Policy Selection
In this section we derive the regulator's optimal policy (m ¤ ;¯¤). It is¯rst necessary to derive the form of the function h (m;¯; ®). Given policy (m;¯) and fallibility w, output per investor will be R precisely when the expected return
from a bank deposit exceeds the return r from a bond market investment: equivalently, when Á (m; w) (1 ¡¯) · b. h (m;¯; w) is therefore given by h (m;¯; w)´8
Let ¹ m (w) and 1 (w) solve the following problem:
Write C (w) for Rf Á ( ¹ m; w) 1 +´¹ m: g (C (w)) is the minimum social cost which ensures a return R. The regulator will incur cost g (C (w)) provided that the net social return from doing so exceeds r. In other words, the policy (m ¤ ;¯¤) will be adopted, where 
where each pair of conditions holds with complementary slackness. Call a solution interior if¯> 0 and m > 0. Proposition 4 The cost of ensuring a return of R at interior points is decreasing in regulator reputation:
We next examine the relationship between regulator fallibility, bank rents and deposit insurance. Firstly, we regard the deposit insurance policy¯as exogenous { for example, it may be set for political rather than economic reasons. ¹ m is then a function of¯and ®. In this case for a given reputation ® there is a trade-o® between rent levels and deposit insurance.
Proposition 5 When¯is a choice variable of the minimisation problem 4 optimal rent levels are decreasing in the level of deposit insurance o®ered:
As we noted in the introduction, this result may explain observed di®erences between the banking sectors in the United States and the United Kingdom. In the former country deposit insurance levels are relatively high; in the latter they are lower. If these policies are hard to change, proposition 5 suggests that the regulator in the United States will encourage a high level of competition while competition in the United Kingdom should be less intense. This is precisely what we observe in practice.
We now examine the variation of the optimal levels of m and¯with w (equivalently, with ®). We require¯rstly the following technical result:
Proposition 6 Bank opacity Á has the following higher order properties:
2. There exists m ¤ 2 (0; M ) such that:
ii.°¤ is an increasing function of m.
We are now in a position to examine the comparative statics ¹ m (w), 1 (w).
Proposition 7 Interior solutions are not possible when condition 8 is satis¯ed.
When 8 ii. The optimal rent level is decreasing in reputation for w 2 (°; w 1 );
iii. If w 1 < w 2 then the optimal rent level is constant at M for w 2
iv. w 1 = w 2 precisely when for every w 2 [°; w ¤ ],´> ¡RfÁ m (M; w);
4. Bailout policy is decreasing in regulator reputation at every interior solution w.
The intuition behind proposition 7 is as follows. Recall that the parameteŕ re°ects the social cost of providing rent to bankers: it may for example re°ect ine±ciencies which are introduced through the suppression of competition. If condition 8 holds then this cost is so high that rents are never a viable policy tool.
If condition 8 is not satis¯ed then when regulator fallibility exceeds w ¤ bankers cannot be sure that high levels of e®ort will be rewarded and the e®ectiveness of rent will therefore be insu±cient to defray its social costs. For fallibilities which are less than or equal to w ¤ , regulatory screening activities provide a su±ciently powerful incentive to banker e®ort to render optimal the provision of some rent.
Reductions in w below w ¤ increase the potency of the regulator's screening activities and the regulator will initially respond by increasing charter value and reducing the size of the insurance policy which he o®ers. Every possible solution incorporates a region where this happens.
If at some value w M the optimal charter value is M with ¹ m If the regulator's reputation becomes very strong (in other words, if°is low enough) then the regulator's screening activities will be so e®ective that he can start to reduce charter value whilst simultaneously reducing insurance payments.
This e®ect arises in the region [°; w 1 ] in part 3(b). This could arise in two ways.
Firstly, it may occur as the reputation increases su±ciently for policy to emerge from an exterior region in which charter values have been constant at M, as in the previous paragraph. Secondly, it may arise when every solution to the problem is an interior one so that the solution curve ¹ m (w) has a turning point. In this case w 1 = w 2 .
If°is too high for this e®ect to obtain for any value of w and optimal charter value never reaches M then charter value will simply increase with reputation at every value w: this is what occurs in part 3(a) of the proposition.
[ Figure 2 ] If the regulator has a fallibility w which is above w R then the current low level of competition in the United Kingdom is indicative of regulator competence.
Conclusion
In this paper we consider the consequences of the assumption that banks increase social welfare by performing monitoring. We argue that an important role of banking regulators is to protect this activity. This contrasts with traditional stories of regulation in which intervention is justi¯ed either to protect dispersed and uninformed bank depositors or to counter the e®ects of banking runs and thus prevent unnecessary and costly premature liquidation of projects. We avoid consideration of liquidity crises by considering single period deposit contracts and we allow depositors to use alternative investment vehicles so that they will desert banks when there is su±cient danger that bankers will abstract funds. Banks in our model use their monitoring skills to achieve higher returns on investments but the proportion of the returns which is veri¯able is stochastic.
Banks abstract the non-veri¯able project returns. In a free banking system this e®ect will be ex post so severe as to destroy the ex ante demand for deposits.
Alternative investment vehicles will then be employed and project returns will be reduced. Regulators will act to prevent this from happening, although they are not per se concerned with distribution.
Regulators have two policy tools: they can vary the rent which accrues to the holder of a banking license and they can supply deposit insurance. They will combine these to ensure the survival of the banking system at the lowest social cost. Regulators have only one skill: they can screen banks to determine whether or not they are exerting e®ort to increase the veri¯able portion of their returns.
Bankers can only receive a license if they pass a prudential audit by the regulator. If the regulator is skilled at screening then bankers will exert a high level of e®ort so as to receive a license and hence to earn rent. If the regulator is not competent then bankers will exert no e®ort to increase the veri¯able part of their returns. It follows that the appropriate policy mix is determined by the regulator's perceived ability: the most able regulators will rely more upon bank charter value and will reduce deposit insurance. Less capable regulators will rely upon deposit insurance. Furthermore, for a given level of regulator competence there is a trade-o® between deposit insurance and charter value: an exogenouslyimposed increase in one is optimally countered by a reduction in the other.
These results have clear policy implications. The¯rst indicates that the appropriate response to improved regulator reputation is a reduction in deposit insurance levels and a simultaneous rise in bank charter value. Charter value could be modi¯ed in several ways: for example, deposit interest rate ceilings will increase the rent derived from a bank license. Competition policy can also be used to modify charter value. Our model therefore reaches the counter-intuitive conclusion that banking sector competition should be suppressed in response to improved regulator reputation.
The second of the above results is of more immediate relevance. Political interference in the banking sector may result in an exogenous change in deposit insurance levels or in charter value. For example, the recent government-commissioned Cruickshank Report (Cruickshank, 2000) recommends an imposed increase in United Kingdom banking sector competition. This will reduce the charter value of a U.K. banking license.
The appropriate response to a ruling of this nature is not clear. If existing charter values are an optimal response to current deposit insurance policies then increased levels of competition should be accompanied by an increase in deposit insurance provisions. The counter-argument is that the proposed competition policy will shift charter values to the optimum level. This debate can be resolved in practice only with reference to the speci¯cs: in the U.K. one might search for any preexisting policy on charter values. The absence of such a policy may be an indication of existing ine±ciencies.
Proof of Proposition 1
For the¯rst part, assumption A5 implies
hich implies immediately that ¾ (°; M ) · 1. Assumption A6 implies that q ¡°( 3q ¡ p) < 0 whence it follows immediately that Rf(q(1¡3w)+pw) E¡4Rfw(q¡p)
< 0 and hence
Finally, note that
For the second part, direct di®erentiation of equation 2 yields the following:
> 0, and
Proof of Proposition 2
Direct di®erentiation of equation 3 yields
Proof of Proposition 4
The result is a trivial consequence of the Envelope Theorem:
Proof of Proposition 5
Write G (m;¯; w) = Á (m; w) (1 ¡¯). Then the¯rst order conditions for the minimization problem are
Taking total derivatives of both of these yields 0
We will require the following lemma:
Proof. Direct di®erentiation and manipulation yields the following:
Note that ¾ m = F ¾ mw ,where
Substitute for ¾ mw in equation 9:
where
It is clear from equation 10 that Á mw = 0 if and only if f (w; ¾) = 0. Di®er-entiate equation 10 with respect to w to obtain
The¯rst part of the lemma is equivalent to the statement that f w (w; ¾) > 0.
Di®erentiating equation 11 yields the following:
This is positive provided
To show this we¯rstly derive an upper bound for ¾ (m; w). The proof of proposition 1 yields
It follows since ¾ ww < 0 that
Since equation 12 can only fail when 1 ¡ 6w + 6w 2 < 0 a su±cient condition for its satisfaction is its truth when ¾ takes the maximum value of equation 13 and F assumes its lower bound ¡ 1 2
(1 ¡ 2w). In this case the left hand side of equation 12 becomes
as required so that the¯rst part of the lemma is proved.
For the second part, di®erentiate equation 9 with respect to m to show that Á mmw has the same sign as
The second and third terms in this expression are positive so the result is proved if w (3w ¡ 2) + ¾ (m; w) (1 ¡ 2w) < 0. This is certainly the case if and w = 1.
Assumption A6 gives us
It follows that w 2 ¡ 1 3 ;
1 2 ¢ and hence that Á mmw < 0 as required.
The¯rst part of the proposition follows by direct di®erentiation:
where the second line follows because ¾ mm = 0.
For the second part, note that
where the second equation is a consequence of the fact that F = 0 when w = 
Proof of Proposition 7
We know
Note that Á m (0; 0:5) = ¡ (q ¡ p) @¾ ( 0; 
which is equivalent to condition 8.
When condition 8 is not satis¯ed it follows that Á m (0;°) · ¡Ŕ f and hence by part two of proposition 6 that there is a unique w ¤ 2 ¡°; 1
s an interior solution to problem 4 when w = w ¤ . This proves the¯rst part of the proposition.
To prove the remainder of the result we require the following lemmas:
Proof. At any interior solution, di®erentiation of the¯rst order conditioń
Since Á mm > 0 it follows that Proof. Assume for a contradiction that for somew < w 1 , Á mw ( ¹ m 0 (w) ;w) > 0. There must bex 2 (w; w 1 ) such that Á mw ( ¹ m (x) ;x) = 0. By lemma 10
for every x 2 (x; w 1 ) there is w x for which ¹ m (w x ) = ¹ m (x). By continuity of Á, there is wx such that ¹ m (wx) = ¹ m (x) and since ¹ m 0 (w x ) < 0 for every x >x, wx 6 =x. Since Á mw ( ¹ m (x) ;x) = 0, part four of proposition 6 implies that
. But both sides of this expression have value ¡Ŕ f which is the desired contradiction.
Lemma 12 Let · (w) be the inverse of°¤ (m).
2. w R is the unique intercept for ¹ m (w) and · (w).
Proof. We prove both parts simultaneously. Let w R be the highest value of w where ¹ m (w) = · (w). For w > w R we clearly have w >°¤ ( ¹ m (w)) and
from part four of proposition 6 that
By lemma 11 for everyw < w 
